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Abstract
We study a strategic version of the multi-armed bandit problem, where each arm
is an individual strategic agent and we, the principal, pull one arm each round. When
pulled, the arm receives some private reward va and can choose an amount xa to pass
on to the principal (keeping va−xa for itself). All non-pulled arms get reward 0. Each
strategic arm tries to maximize its own utility over the course of T rounds. Our goal
is to design an algorithm for the principal incentivizing these arms to pass on as much
of their private rewards as possible.
When private rewards are stochastically drawn each round (vta ← Da), we show
that:
• Algorithms that perform well in the classic adversarial multi-armed bandit setting
necessarily perform poorly: For all algorithms that guarantee low regret in an
adversarial setting, there exist distributions D1, . . . ,Dk and an approximate Nash
equilibrium for the arms where the principal receives reward o(T ).
• Still, there exists an algorithm for the principal that induces a game among the
arms where each arm has a dominant strategy. When each arm plays its dominant
strategy, the principal sees expected reward µ′T − o(T ), where µ′ is the second-
largest of the means E[Da]. This algorithm maintains its guarantee if the arms are
non-strategic (xa = va), and also if there is a mix of strategic and non-strategic
arms.
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1 Introduction
Classically, algorithms for problems in machine learning assume that their inputs are drawn
either stochastically from some fixed distribution or chosen adversarially. In many contexts,
these assumptions do a fine job of characterizing the possible behavior of problem inputs.
Increasingly, however, these algorithms are being applied to contexts (ad auctions, search
engine optimization, credit scoring, etc.) where the quantities being learned are controlled
by rational agents with external incentives. To this end, it is important to understand how
these algorithms behave in strategic settings.
The multi-armed bandit problem is a fundamental decision problem in machine learning
that models the trade-off between exploration and exploitation, and is used extensively as a
building block in other machine learning algorithms (e.g. reinforcement learning). A learner
(who we refer to as the principal) is a sequential decision maker who at each time step t,
must decide which of k arms to ‘pull’. Pulling this arm bestows a reward (either adversarially
or stochastically generated) to the principal, and the principal would like to maximize his
overall reward. Known algorithms for this problem guarantee that the principal can do
approximately as well as the best individual arm.
In this paper, we consider a strategic model for the multi-armed bandit problem where
each arm is an individual strategic agent and each round one arm is pulled by an agent we
refer to as the principal. Each round, the pulled arm receives a private reward v ∈ [0, 1] and
then decides what amount x of this reward gets passed on to the principal (upon which the
principal receives utility x and the arm receives utility v − x). Each arm therefore has a
natural tradeoff between keeping most of its reward for itself and passing on the reward so
as to be chosen more frequently. Our goal is to design mechanisms for the principal which
simultaneously learn which arms are valuable while also incentivizing these arms to pass on
most of their rewards.
This model captures a variety of dynamic agency problems, where at each time step the
principal must choose to employ one of K agents to perform actions on the principal’s behalf,
where the agent’s cost of performing that action is unknown to the principal (for example,
hiring one of K contractors to perform some work, or hiring one of K investors with external
information to manage some money). In this sense, this model can be thought of as a multi-
agent generalization of the principal-agent problem in contract theory (see Section 1.2 for
references). The model also captures, for instance, the interaction between consumers (as
the principal) and many sellers deciding how steep a discount to offer the consumers - higher
prices now lead to immediate revenue, but offering better discounts than your competitors
will lead to future sales. In all domains, our model aims to capture settings where the
principal has little domain-specific or market-specific knowledge, and can really only process
the reward they get for pulling an arm and not any external factors that contributed to that
reward.
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1.1 Our results
1.1.1 Low-regret algorithms are far from strategyproof
Many algorithms for the multi-armed bandit problem are designed to work in worst-case
settings, where an adversary can adaptively decide the value of each arm pull. Here, algo-
rithms such as EXP3 ([ACBFS03]) guarantee that the principal receives almost as much as
if he had only pulled the best arm. Formally, such algorithms guarantee that the principal
experiences at most O(
√
T ) regret over T rounds compared to any algorithm that only plays
a single arm (when the adversary is oblivious).
Given these worst-case guarantees, one might naively expect low-regret algorithms such
as EXP3 to also perform well in our strategic variant. It is important to note, however,
that single arm strategies perform dismally in this strategic setting; if the principal only
ever selects one arm, the arm has no incentive to pass along any surplus to the principal.
In fact, we show that the objectives of minimizing adversarial regret and performing well in
this strategic variant are fundamentally at odds.
Theorem 1.1 (informal restatement of Theorem 3.4). Let M be a low-regret algorithm for
the classic multi-armed bandit problem with adversarially chosen values. Then there exists
an instance of the strategic multi-armed bandit problem and an o(T )-Nash equilibrium for
the arms where a principal running M receives at most o(T ) revenue.
Here we assume the game is played under a tacit observational model, meaning that arms
can only observe which arms get pulled by the principal, but not how much value they give
to the principal. In the explicit observational model, where arms can see both which arms
get pulled and how much value they pass on, even stronger results hold.
Theorem 1.2 (informal restatement of Theorem 3.1). Let M be a low-regret algorithm for
the classic multi-armed bandit problem with adversarially chosen values. Then there exists
an instance of the strategic multi-armed bandit problem in the explicit observational model
along with a o(T )-Nash equilibrium for the arms where a principal running M receives zero
revenue.
While not immediately apparent from the above claims, these instances where low-regret
algorithms fail are far from pathological; in particular, there is a problematic equilibrium for
any instance where arm i receives a fixed reward vi each round it is pulled, as long as the
the gap between the largest and second-largest vi is not too large (roughly 1/#arms).
The driving cause behind both results is possible collusion between the arms (similar to
collusion that occurs in the setting of repeated auctions, see [SH04]). For example, consider
a simple instance of this problem with two strategic arms, where arm 1 always gets private
reward 1 if pulled and arm 2 always gets private reward 0.8. In this example, we also assume
the principal is using algorithm EXP3. By always reporting some value slightly larger than
0.8, arm 1 can incentivize the principal to almost always pull it in the long run. This gains
arm 1 roughly 0.2 utility per round (and arm 2 nothing). On the other hand, if arm 1 and
arm 2 never pass along any surplus to the principal, they will likely be played equally often,
gaining arm 1 roughly 0.5 utility per round and arm 2 0.4 utility per round.
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To show such a market-sharing strategy works for general low-regret algorithms, much
more work needs to be done. The arms must be able to enforce an even split of the principal’s
pulls (as soon as the principal starts lopsidedly pulling one arm more often than the others,
the remaining arms can defect and start reporting their full value whenever pulled). As long
as the principal guarantees good performance in the non-strategic adversarial case (achieving
o(T ) regret), we show that the arms can (at o(T ) cost to themselves) cooperate so that they
are all played equally often.
1.1.2 Mechanisms for strategic arms with stochastic values
We next show that, in certain settings, it is in fact possible for the principal to extract
positive values from the arms per round. We consider a setting where each arm i’s reward
when pulled is drawn independently from some distribution Di with mean µi (known to arm
i but not to the principal). In this case the principal can extract the value of the second-best
arm. In the below statement, we are using the term “truthful mechanism” quite loosely as
shorthand for “strategy that induces a game among the arms where each arm has a dominant
strategy.”
Theorem 1.3 (restatement of Corollary 4.2). Let µ′ be the second largest mean amongst the
set of µis. Then there exists a truthful mechanism for the principal that guarantees revenue
at least µ′T − o(T ) when arms use their dominant strategies.
The mechanism in Theorem 1.3 is a slight modification of the second-price auction strat-
egy adapted to the multi-armed bandit setting. The principal begins by asking each arm
i for its mean µi, where we incentivize arms to answer truthfully by recompensating arms
according to a proper scoring rule. For the remainder of the rounds, the principal then
asks the arm with the highest mean to give him the second-largest mean worth of value per
round. If this arm fails to comply in any round, the principal avoids picking this arm for
the remainder of the rounds. (A more detailed description of the mechanism can be seen in
Mechanism 1 in Section 4). In addition, we show that the performance of this mechanism is
as good as possible in this setting; no mechanism can do better than the second-best arm in
the worst case (Lemma 4.3).
We further show how to adapt this mechanism in the setting where some arms are
strategic and some arms are non-strategic (and our mechanism does not know which arms
are which).
Theorem 1.4 (restatement of Theorem 4.5). Let µs be the second largest mean amongst the
means of the strategic arms, and let µn be the largest mean amongst the means of the non-
strategic arms. Then there exists a truthful mechanism for the principal that guarantees (with
probability 1− o(1/T )) revenue at least max(µs, µn)T − o(T ) when arms use their dominant
strategies.
A detailed description of the modified mechanism can be found in Mechanism 2 in Section
4.
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1.2 Related work
The study of classical multi-armed bandit problems was initiated by [Rob52], and has since
grown into an active area of study. The most relevant results for our paper concern the
existence of low-regret bandit algorithms in the adversarial setting, such as the EXP 3
algorithm ([ACBFS03]), which achieves regret O˜(
√
KT ). Other important results in the
classical setting include the upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithm for stochastic bandits
([LR85]) and the work of [GJ74] for Markovian bandits. For further details about multi-
armed bandit problems, see the survey [BC12].
One question that arises in the strategic setting (and other adaptive settings for multi-
armed bandits) is what the correct notion of regret is; standard notions of regret guarantee
little, since the best overall arm may still have a small total reward. [ADT12] considered
the multi-armed bandit problem with an adaptive adversary and introduced the quantity of
“policy regret”, which takes the adversary’s adaptiveness into account. They showed that
any multi-armed bandit algorithm will get Ω(T ) policy regret. This indicates that it is not
enough to treat strategic behaviors as an instance of adaptively adversarial behavior; good
mechanisms for the strategic multi-armed bandits problem must explicitly take advantage
of the rational self-interest of the arms.
Our model bears some similarities to the principal-agent problem of contract theory,
where a principal employs an more informed agent to make decisions on behalf of the princi-
pal, but where the agent may have incentives misaligned from the principal’s interests when
it gets private savings (for example [Cha13]). For more details on principal-agent problem,
see the book [LM02]. Our model can be thought of as a sort of multi-armed version of the
principal-agent problem, where the principal has many agents to select from (the arms) and
can try to use competition between the agents to align their interests with the principal.
Our negative results are closely related to results on collusions in repeated auctions.
Existing theoretical work [MM92, AB01, JR99, Aoy03, Aoy07, SH04] has shown that col-
lusive schemes exist in repeated auctions in many different settings, e.g., with/without side
payments, with/without communication, with finite/infinite typespace. In some settings, ef-
ficient collusion can be achieved, i.e., bidders can collude to allocate the good to the bidders
who values it the most and leave 0 asymptotically to the seller. Even without side payments
and communication, [SH04] showed that tacit collusion exists and can achieve asymptotic
efficiency with a large cartel.
Our truthful mechanism uses a proper scoring rule [Bri50, McC56] implicitly. In gen-
eral, scoring rules are used to assessing the accuracy of a probabilistic prediction. In our
mechanisms, we use a logarithmic scoring rule to incentivize arms to truthfully report their
average rewards.
Our setting is similar to settings considered in a variety of work on dynamic mechanism
design, often inspired by online advertising. [BV96] considers the problem where a buyer
wants to buy a stream of goods with an unknown value from two sellers, and examines
Markov perfect equilibria in this model. [BSS09, DK09, BKS10] study truthful pay-per-click
auctions where the auctioneer wishes to design a truthful mechanism that maximizes the
social welfare. [KMP14, FKKK14] consider the scenario where the principal cannot directly
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choose which arm to pull, and instead must incentivize a stream of strategic players to prevent
them from acting myopically. [ARS13, ARS14] consider a setting where a seller repeatedly
sells to a buyer with unknown value distribution, but the buyer is more heavily discounted
than the seller. [KLN13] develops a general method for finding optimal mechanisms in
settings with dynamic private information. [NSV08] develops an ex ante efficient mechanism
for the Cost-Per-Action charging scheme in online advertising.
1.3 Open Problems and Future Directions
We are far from understanding the complete picture of multi-armed bandit problems in
strategic settings. Many questions remain, both in our model and related models.
One limitation of our negative results is that they only show there exists some ‘bad’
approximate Nash equilibrium for the arms, i.e., one where any low-regret principal receives
little revenue. This, however, says nothing about the space of all approximate Nash equilib-
ria. Does there exist a low-regret mechanism for the principal along with an approximate
Nash equilibria for the arms where the principal extracts significant utility? An affirmative
answer to this question would raise hope for the possibility of a mechanism that can per-
form well in both the adversarial and strategic setting, whereas a negative answer would
strengthen our claim that these two settings are fundamentally at odds.
One limitation of our positive results is that all of the learning takes place at the beginning
of the protocol, and is deferred to the arms themselves. As a result, our mechanism fails
in cases where the arms’ distributions can change over time. Is it possible to design good
mechanisms for such settings? Ideally, any good mechanism should learn the arms’ values
continually throughout the T rounds, but this seems to open up the possibility of collusion
between the arms.
Throughout this paper, whenever we consider strategic bandits we assume their rewards
are stochastically generated. Can we say anything about strategic bandits with adversarially
generated rewards? The issue here seems to be defining what a strategic equilibrium is in
this case - arms need some underlying priors to reason about their future expected utility.
One possibility is to consider what happens when the arms all play no-regret strategies with
respect to some broad class of strategies.
Finally, there are other quantities one may wish to optimize instead of the utility of the
principal. For example, is it possible to design an efficient principal, who almost always picks
the best arm (even if the arm passes along little to the principal)? Theorem 3.4 implies the
answer is no if the principal also has to be efficient in the adversarial case, but are there
other models where we can answer this question affirmatively?
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Classic Multi-Armed Bandits
We begin by reviewing the definition of the classic multi-armed bandits problem and associ-
ated quantities.
In the classic multi-armed bandit problem a learner (the principal) chooses one of K
choices (arms) per round, over T rounds. On round t, the principal receives some reward
vi,t ∈ [0, 1] for pulling arm i. The values vi,t are either drawn independently from some
distribution corresponding to arm i (in the case of stochastic bandits) or adaptively chosen
by an adversary (in the case of adversarial bandits). Unless otherwise specified, we will
assume we are in the adversarial setting.
Let It denote the arm pulled by the principal at round t. The revenue of an algorithm
M is the random variable
Rev(M) =
T∑
t=1
vIt,t
and the the regret of M is the random variable
Reg(M) = max
i
T∑
t=1
vi,t − Rev(M)
Definition 2.1 (δ-Low Regret Algorithm). Mechanism M is a δ-low regret algorithm for
the multi-armed bandit problem if
E[Reg(M)] ≤ δ.
Here the expectation is taken over the randomness of M and the adversary.
Definition 2.2 ((ρ, δ)-Low Regret Algorithm). MechanismM is a (ρ, δ)-low regret algorithm
for the multi-armed bandit problem if with probability 1− ρ,
Reg(M) ≤ δ.
There exist O(
√
KT logK)-low regret algorithms and (ρ, O(
√
KT log(K/ρ)))-low regret
algorithms for the multi-armed bandit problem; see Section 3.2 of [BC12] for details.
2.2 Strategic Multi-Armed Bandits
The strategic multi-armed bandits problem builds upon the classic multi-armed bandits
problem with the notable difference that now arms are strategic agents with the ability to
withhold some payment from the principal. Instead of the principal directly receiving a
reward vi,t when choosing arm i, now arm i receives this reward and passes along some
amount wi,t to the principal, gaining the remainder vi,t − wi,t as utility.
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For simplicity, in the strategic setting, we will assume the rewards vi,t are generated
stochastically; that is, each round, vi,t is drawn independently from a distribution Di (where
the distributions Di are known to all arms but not to the principal). While it is possible to
pose this problem in the adversarial setting (or other more general settings), this comes at
the cost of there being no clear notion of strategic equilibrium for the arms.
This strategic variant comes with two additional modeling assumptions. The first is the
informational model of this game; what information does an arm observe when some other
arm is pulled. We define two possible observational models:
1. Explicit: After each round t, every arm sees the arm played It along with the quantity
wIt,t reported to the principal.
2. Tacit: After each round t, every arm only sees the arm played It.
In both cases, only arm i knows the size of the original reward vi,t; in particular, the
principal also only sees the value wi,t and learns nothing about the amount withheld by the
arm. Collusion between arms is generally easier in the explicit observational model than in
the tacit observational model.
The second modeling assumption is whether to allow arms to go into debt while paying
the principal. In the restricted payment model, we impose that wi,t ≤ vi,t; an arm cannot
pass along more than it receives in a given round. In the unrestricted payment model, we
let wi,t be any value in [0, 1]. We prove our negative results in the restricted payment model
and our positive results in the unrestricted payment model, but our proofs for our negative
results work in both models (in particular, it is easier to collude and prove negative results
in the unrestricted payment model).
Finally, we proceed to define the set of strategic equilibria for the arms. We assume the
mechanism M of the principal is fixed ahead of time and known to the K arms. If each arm
i is using a (possibly adaptive) strategy Si, then the expected utility of arm i is defined as
ui(M,S1, . . . , SK) = E
[
T∑
t=1
(vi,t − wi,t) · 1It=i
]
.
An ε-Nash equilibrium for the arms is then defined as follows.
Definition 2.3 (ε-Nash Equilibrium for the arms). Strategies (S1, ..., SK) form an ε-Nash
equilibrium for the strategic multi-armed bandit problem if for all i ∈ [n] and any deviating
strategy S ′i,
ui(S1, . . . , Si, . . . , SK) ≥ ui(S1, . . . , S ′i, . . . , SK)− ε.
The goal of the principal is to choose a mechanism M which guarantees large revenue in
any ε-Nash Equilibrium for the arms.
In Section 4, we will construct mechanisms for the strategic multi-armed bandit problem
which are truthful for the arms. We define the related terminology below.
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Definition 2.4 (Dominant Strategy). When the principal uses mechanism M , we say Si is
a dominant strategy for arm i if for any deviating strategy S ′i and any strategies for other
arms S1, .., Si−1, Si+1, ..., SK,
ui(M,S1, . . . , Si, . . . , SK) ≥ ui(M,S1, . . . , S ′i, . . . , SK).
Definition 2.5 (Truthfulness). We say that a mechanism M for the principal is truthful, if
all arms have some dominant strategies.
3 Negative Results
In this section, we show that algorithms that achieve low-regret in the multi-armed bandits
problem with adversarial values perform poorly in the strategic multi-armed bandits problem.
Throughout this section, we will assume we are working in the restricted payment model
(i.e., arms can only pass along a value wi,t that is at most vi,t), but all proofs work also work
in the unrestricted payment model (and in fact are much easier there).
3.1 Explicit Observational Model
We begin by showing that in the explicit observational model, there is an approximate
equilibrium for the arms that results in the principal receiving no revenue. Since arms can
view other arms’ reported values, it is easy to collude in the explicit model; simply defect
and pass along the full amount as soon as you observe another arm passing along a positive
amount.
Theorem 3.1. Let mechanism M be a δ-low regret algorithm for the multi-armed bandit
problem. Then in the strategic multi-armed bandit problem under the explicit observational
model, there exist distributions Di and a (δ + 1)-Nash equilibrium for the arms where a
principal using mechanism M receives zero revenue.
Proof. Consider the two-arm setting where D1 and D2 are both deterministic distributions
supported entirely on {1}, so that vi,t = 1 for all i = 1, 2 and t ∈ [T ]. Consider the following
strategy S∗ for arm i:
1. Set wi,t = 0 if at time 1, ..., t− 1, the other arm always reports 0 when pulled.
2. Set wi,t = 1 otherwise.
We will show that (S∗, S∗) is a (δ + 1)-Nash Equilibrium. It suffices to show that arm
1 can get at most δ + 1 more utility by deviating. Consider any deviating strategy S ′ for
arm 1. By convexity, we can assume S ′ is deterministic (there is some best deterministic
deviating strategy). Since mechanism M might be randomized, let R be the randomness
used by M and define MR to be the deterministic mechanism when M uses randomness
R. Now, consider the case when arm 1 plays strategy S ′, arm 2 plays strategy S∗ and the
principal is usings mechanism MR.
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1. If arm 1 never reports any value larger than 0 when pulled, then S ′ behaves exactly
the same as S∗. Therefore,
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) = u1(MR, S
∗, S∗).
2. If arm 1 ever reports some value larger than 0 when pulled, let τR be the first time it
does so. We know that S ′ behaves the same as S∗ before τR. Therefore,
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) ≤ u1(MR, S∗, S∗) +
T∑
t=τR
(v1,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ u1(MR, S∗, S∗) + 1 +
T∑
t=τR+1
(max(w1,t, w2,t)− w1,t) · 1It=1
So in general, we have
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) ≤ ui(MR, S∗, S∗) + 1 +
T∑
t=τR+1
(max(w1,t, w2,t)− w1,t) · 1It=1.
Therefore
u1(M,S
′, S∗) = ER[u1(MR, S
′, S∗)]
≤ ER[u1(MR, S∗, S∗)] + 1 + ER
[
T∑
t=τR+1
(max(w1,t, w2,t)− w1,t) · 1It=1
]
= u1(M,S
∗, S∗) + 1 + ER
[
T∑
t=τR+1
(max(w1,t, w2,t)− w1,t) · 1It=1
]
.
Notice that this expectation is at most the regret of M in the classic multi-armed bandit
setting when the adversary sets rewards equal to the values w1,t and w2,t passed on by the
arms when they play (S ′, S∗). Therefore, by our low-regret guarantee on M , we have that
ER
[
T∑
t=τR+1
(max(w1,t, w2,t)− w1,t) · 1It=1
]
≤ δ.
Thus
u1(M,S
′, S∗) ≤ u1(M,S∗, S∗) + 1 + δ
and this is a (1 + δ)-approximate Nash equilibrium. Finally, it is easy to check that the
principal receives zero revenue when both arms play according to this equilibrium strategy.
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3.2 Tacit Observational Model
We next show that even in the tacit observational model, where the arms don’t see the
amounts passed on by other arms, it is still possible for the arms to collude and leave the
principal with o(T ) revenue. The underlying idea here is that the arms work to try to
maintain an equal market share, where each of the K arms are each played approximately
1/K of the time. To ensure this happens, arms collude so that arms that aren’t as likely to
be pulled pass along a tiny amount ǫ to the principal, whereas arms that have been pulled a
lot or are more likely to be pulled pass along 0; this ends up forcing any low-regret algorithm
for the principal to choose all the arms equally often. Interestingly, unlike the collusion
strategy in the explicit observational model, this collusion strategy is mechanism dependent,
as arms need to estimate the probability they will be pulled in the next round.
We begin by proving this result for the case of two arms, where the proof is slightly
simpler.
Theorem 3.2. Let mechanism M be a (ρ, δ)-low regret algorithm for the multi-armed bandit
problem with two arms, where ρ ≤ T−2 and δ ≥ √T log T . Then in the strategic multi-armed
bandit problem under the tacit observational model, there exist distributions D1, D2 and an
O(
√
Tδ)-Nash Equilibrium where a principal using mechanism M gets at most O(
√
Tδ) rev-
enue.
Proof. Let D1 and D2 be distributions with means µ1 and µ2 respectively, such that |µ1 −
µ2| ≤ max(µ1, µ2)/2. Additionally, assume both D1 and D2 are supported on [
√
δ/T , 1]. We
now describe the equilibrium strategy S∗ (the below description is for arm 1; S∗ for arm 2
is symmetric):
1. Set parameters B = 6
√
Tδ and θ =
√
δ
T
.
2. Define c1,t to be the number times arm 1 is pulled in rounds 1, ..., t. Similarly define
c2,t to be the number times arm 2 is pulled in rounds 1, ..., t.
3. For t = 1, . . . , T :
(a) If there exists a t′ ≤ t− 1 such that c1,t′ < c2,t′ − B, set w1,t = v1,t.
(b) If the condition in (a) is not true, let p1,t be the probability that the principal
will pick arm 1 in this round conditioned on the history (assuming player 2 is also
playing S∗), and let p2,t = 1− p1,t. Then:
i. If c1,t−1 < c2,t−1 and p1,t < p2,t, set w1,t = θ.
ii. Otherwise, set w1,t = 0.
We will now show that (S∗, S∗) is an O(
√
Tδ)-Nash equilibrium. To do this, for any
deviating strategy S ′, we will both lower bound u1(M,S
∗, S∗) and upper bound u1(M,S
′, S∗),
hence bounding the net utility of deviation.
We begin by proving that u1(M,S
∗, S∗) ≥ µ2T
2
−O(√Tδ). We need the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.3. If both arms are using strategy S∗, then with probability
(
1− 4
T
)
, |c1,t−c2,t| ≤ B
for all t ∈ [T ].
Proof. Assume that both arms are playing the strategy S∗ with the modification that they
never defect (i.e. condition (a) in the above strategy is removed). This does not change the
probability that |c1,t − c2,t| ≤ B for all t ∈ [T ].
Define R1,t =
∑t
s=1w1,s−
∑t
s=1wIs,s be the regret the principal experiences for not playing
only arm 1. Define R2,t similarly. We will begin by showing that with high probability, these
regrets are bounded both above and below. In particular, we will show that with probability
at least 1− 2
T
, Ri,t lies in [−2θ
√
T log T − δ, δ] for all t ∈ [T ] and i ∈ {1, 2}.
To do this, note that there are two cases where the regrets R1,t and R2,t can possi-
bly change. The first is when p1,t > p2,t and c1,t > c2,t. In this case, the arms of-
fer (w1,t, w2,t) = (0, θ). With probability p1,t the principal chooses arm 1 and the re-
grets update to (R1,t+1, R2,t+1) = (R1,t, R2,t + θ), and with probability p2,t the principal
chooses arm 2 and the regrets update to (R1,t+1, R2,t+1) = (R1,t − θ, R2,t). It follows that
E[R1,t+1 +R2,t+1|R1,t +R2,t] = R1,t +R2,t + (p1,t − p2,t)θ ≥ R1,t +R2,t.
In the second case, p1,t < p2,t and c2,t < c1,t, and a similar calculation shows again that
E[R1,t+1+R2,t+1|R1,t+R2,t] = R1,t+R2,t+(p2,t−p1,t)θ ≥ R1,t+R2,t. It follows that R1,t+R2,t
forms a submartingale.
From the above analysis, it is also clear that |(R1,t+1 +R2,t+1)− (R1,t +R2,t)| ≤ θ. It
follows from Azuma’s inequality that, for any fixed t ∈ [T ],
Pr
[
R1,t +R2,t ≤ −2θ
√
T log T
]
≤ 1
T 2
Applying the union bound, with probability at least 1 − 1
T
, R1,t + R2,t ≥ −2θ
√
T log T
for all t ∈ [T ]. Furthermore, since the principal is using a (T−2, δ)-low-regret algorithm, it
is also true that with probability at least 1− T−2 (for any fixed t) both R1,t and R2,t are at
most δ. Applying the union bound again, it is true that R1,t ≤ δ and R2,t ≤ δ for all t with
probability at least 1− 1
T
. Finally, combining this with the earlier inequality (and applying
union bound once more), with probability at least 1 − 2
T
, Ri,t ∈
[−2θ√T log T − δ, δ], as
desired. For the remainder of the proof, condition on this being true.
We next proceed to bound the probability that (for a fixed t) c1,t − c2,t ≤ B. Define
the random variable τ to be the largest value s ≤ t such that c1,τ − c2,τ = 0 – note that if
c1,t − c2,t ≥ 0, then c1,s − c2,s ≥ 0 for all s in the range [τ, t]. Additionally let ∆s denote the
±1 random variable given by the difference (c1,s− c2,s)− (c1,s−1− c2,s−1). We can then write
c1,t − c2,t ≤
t∑
s=τ+1
∆s
≤
t∑
s=τ+1
∆s · 1p1,s>p2,s +
t∑
s=τ+1
∆s · 1p1,s≤p2,s
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Here the first summand corresponds to times s where one of the arms offers θ (and hence
the regrets change), and the second summand corresponds to times where both arms offer
0. Note that since c1,s ≥ c2,s in this interval, the regret R2,s increases by θ whenever ∆s = 1
(i.e., arm 1 is chosen), and furthermore no choice of arm can decrease R2,s in this interval.
Since we know that R2,s lies in the interval
[−2θ√T log T − δ, δ] for all s, this bounds the
first sum by
t∑
s=τ+1
∆s · 1p1,s>p2,s ≤
2δ + 2θ
√
T log T
θ
=
2δ
θ
+ 2
√
T log T
On the other hand, when p1,s ≤ p2,s, then E[∆s] = p1,s − p2,s ≤ 0. By Hoeffding’s
inequality, it then follows that with probability at least 1− 1
T 2
,
t∑
s=τ+1
∆s · 1p1,s≤p2,s ≤ 2
√
T log T
Altogether, this shows that with probability at least 1− 1
T 2
,
c1,t − c2,t ≤ 2δ
θ
+ 4
√
T log T ≤ 6
√
Tδ = B
The above inequality therefore holds for all t with probability at least 1 − 1
T
. Likewise,
we can show that c2,t − c1,t ≤ B also holds for all t with probability at least 1 − 1T . Since
we are conditioned on the regrets Ri,t being bounded (which is true with probability at least
2
T
), it follows that |c1,t − c2,t| ≤ B for all t with probability at least 1− 4T .
By Lemma 3.3, we know that with probability 1 − 4
T
, |c1,t − c2,t| ≤ B throughout the
mechanism. In this case, arm 1 never uses step (a), and c1,T ≥ (T − B)/2. Therefore
u1(M,S
∗, S∗) ≥
(
1− 4
T
)
· (µ1 − θ) · (T − B)/2
≥ µ1T
2
(
1− 4
T
− θ
µ1
− B
T
)
=
µ1T
2
− 2µ1 − θT
2
− Bµ1
2
≥ µ1T
2
− O(
√
Tδ)
Now we will show that u1(M,S
′, S∗) ≤ µ1T
2
+O(
√
Tδ). Without loss of generality, we can
assume S ′ is deterministic. Let MR be the deterministic mechanism when M ’s randomness
is fixed to some outcome R. Consider the situation when arm 1 is using strategy S ′, arm 2
is using strategy S∗ and the principal is using mechanism MR. There are two cases:
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1. c1,t − c2,t ≤ B is true for all t ∈ [T ]. In this case, we have
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) ≤ c1,T · µ1 ≤ µ1(T +B)/2.
2. There exists some t such that c1,t − c2,t > B: Let τR + 1 be the smallest t such that
c1,t − c2,t > B. We know that c1,τR − c2,τR ≤ B. Therefore we have
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) =
T∑
t=1
(µ1 − w1,t) · 1It=1
=
T∑
t=1
(µ1 − w2,t) · 1It=1 +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ c1,τRµ1 + µ1 + (T − τR − 1)max(µ1 − µ2, 0) +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ µ1(τR +B)/2 + µ1 + (T − τR − 1)(µ1/2) +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ µ1T/2 + µ1(B + 1)/2 +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1.
In general, we thus have that
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) ≤ µ1T/2 + µ1(B + 1)/2 + max
(
0,
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
)
.
Therefore
u1(M,S
′, S∗) = ER[u1(MR, S
′, S∗)]
≤ µ1T/2 + µ1(B + 1)/2 + ER
[
max
(
0,
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
)]
.
Notice that
∑T
t=1(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1 is the regret of not playing arm 2 (i.e., R2 in the proof
of Lemma 3.3). Since the mechanism M is (ρ, δ) low regret, with probability 1− ρ, this sum
is at most δ (and in the worst case, it is bounded above by Tµ2). We therefore have that:
u1(M,S
′, S∗) ≤ µ1T
2
+
µ1(B + 1)
2
+ δ + ρTµ2
≤ µ1T
2
+O(
√
Tδ)
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From this and our earlier lower bound on u1(M,S
∗, S∗), it follows that u1(M,S
′, S∗) −
u1(M,S
∗, S∗) ≤ O(√Tδ), thus establishing that (S∗, S∗) is an O(√Tδ)-Nash equilibrium for
the arms.
Finally, to bound the revenue of the principal, note that if the arms both play according
to S∗ and |c1,t − c2,t| ≤ B for all t (so they do not defect), the principal gets a maximum of
Tθ = O(
√
Tδ) revenue overall. Since (by Lemma 3.3) this happens with probability at least
1− 4
T
(and the total amount of revenue the principal is bounded above by T ), it follows that
the total expected revenue of the principal is at most O(
√
Tδ).
We now extend this proof to the K arm case, where K can be as large as T 1/3/ log(T ).
Theorem 3.4. Let mechanism M be a (ρ, δ)-low regret algorithm for the multi-armed bandit
problem with K arms, where K ≤ T 1/3/ log(T ), ρ ≤ T−2, and δ ≥ √T log T . Then in
the strategic multi-armed bandit problem under the tacit observational model, there exist
distributions Di and an O(
√
KTδ)-Nash Equilibrium for the arms where the principal gets
at most O(
√
KTδ) revenue.
Proof Sketch. As in the previous proof, let µi denote the mean of the ith arm’s distribution
Di. Without loss of generality, further assume that µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µK . We will show that
as long as µ1 − µ2 ≤ µ1K , there exists some O(
√
KTδ)-Nash equilibrium for the arms where
the principal gets at most O(
√
KTδ) revenue.
We begin by describing the equilibrium strategy S∗ for the arms. Let ci,t denote the
number of times arm i has been pulled up to time t. As before, set B = 7
√
KTδ and set
θ =
√
Kδ
T
. The equilibrium strategy for arm i at time t is as follows:
1. If at any time s ≤ t in the past, there exists an arm j with cj,s − ci,s ≥ B, defect and
offer your full value wi,t = µi.
2. Compute the probability pi,t, the probability that the principal will pull arm i condi-
tioned on the history so far.
3. Offer wi,t = θ(1− pi,t).
The remainder of the proof proceeds similarly as the proof of Theorem 3.2. The full proof
can be found in Appendix A.
While the theorems above merely claim that a bad set of distributions for the arms exists,
note that the proofs above show it is possible to collude in a wide range of instances - in
particular, any set of distributions which satisfy µ1 − µ2 ≤ µ1/K. A natural question is
whether we can extend the above results to show that it is possible to collude in any set of
distributions.
One issue with the collusion strategies in the above proofs is that if µ1 − µ2 > µ1/K,
then arm 1 will have an incentive to defect in any collusive strategy that plays all the arms
evenly (arm 1 can report a bit over µ2 per round, and make µ1 − µ2 every round instead of
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µ1 every K rounds). One solution to this is to design a collusive strategy that plays some
arms more than others in equilibrium (for example, playing arm 1 90% of the time). We
show how to modify our result for two arms to achieve an arbitrary market partition and
thus work over a broad set of distributions.
Theorem 3.5. Let mechanism M be a (ρ, δ)-low regret algorithm for the multi-armed bandit
problem with two arms, where ρ ≤ T−2 and δ ≥ √T log T . Then, in the strategic multi-
armed bandit problem under the tacit observational model, for any distributions D1, D2 of
values for the arms (supported on [
√
δ/T , 1]), there exists an O(
√
Tδ)-Nash Equilibrium for
the arms where a principal using mechanism M gets at most O(
√
Tδ) revenue.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Unfortunately, it as not as easy to modify the proof of Theorem 3.4 to prove the same
result for K arms. It is an interesting open question whether there exist collusive strategies
for K arms that can achieve an arbitrary partition of the market.
4 Positive Results
In this section we will show that, in contrast to the previous results on collusion, there
exists a mechanism for the principal that can obtain Θ(T ) revenue from the arms. This
mechanism essentially incentivizes each arm to report the mean of its distribution and then
runs a second-price auction, asking the arm with the highest mean for the second-highest
mean each round. By slightly modifying this mechanism, we can obtain a mechanism that
works for a combination of strategic and non-strategic arms.
Throughout this section we will assume we are working in the tacit observational model
and the unrestricted payment model.
4.1 All Strategic Arms with Stochastic Values
We begin by considering the case when all arms are strategic.
Define µi as the mean of distribution Di for i = 1, . . . , K and u = − log (mini:µi 6=0 µi)+1.
We assume throughout that u = o(T/K).
We will first show that the dominant strategy of each arm in this mechanism includes
truthfully reporting their mean at the beginning, and then then compute the principal’s
revenue under this dominant strategy.
Lemma 4.1. The following strategy is the dominant strategy for arm i in Mechanism 1:
1. (line 1 of Mechanism 1) Report the mean value µi of Di the first time when arm i is
played.
2. (lines 3,4 of Mechanism 1) If i = i∗, for the R rounds that the principal expects to see
reported value w′, report the value w′. For the bonus round, report 0. If i 6= i∗, report
0.
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Mechanism 1: Truthful mechanism for strategic arms with known stochastic values in the tacit
model
1 Play each arm once (i.e. play arm 1 in the first round, arm 2 in the second round, etc.). Let wi be
the value arm i reports in round i.
2 Let i∗ = argmaxwi (breaking ties lexicographically), and let w
′ = maxi 6=i∗ wi.
3 Tell arm i∗ the value of w′. Play arm i∗ for R = T − (u+ 2)K − 1 rounds. If arm i∗ ever reports a
value different from w′, stop playing it immediately. If arm i∗ always gives w′, play it for one
bonus round (ignoring the value it reports).
4 For each arm i such that i 6= i∗, play it for one round.
5 For each arm i satisfying u+ log(wi) ≥ 0, play it ⌊u+ log(wi)⌋ times. Then, with probability
u+ log(wi)− ⌊u+ log(wi)⌋, play arm i for one more round.
3. (line 5 of Mechanism 1) For all other rounds, report 0.
Proof. Note that the mechanism is naturally divided into three parts (in the same way the
strategy above is divided into three parts): (1) the start, where each arm is played once
and reports its mean, (2) the middle, where the principal plays the best arm and extracts
the second-best arm’s value (and plays each other arm once), and (3) the end, where the
principal plays each arm some number of times, effectively paying them off for responding
truthfully in step (1). To show the above strategy is dominant, we will proceed by backwards
induction, showing that each part of the strategy is the best conditioned on an arbitrary
history.
We start with step (3). It is easy to check that these rounds don’t affect how many times
the arm is played or not. It follows that it is strictly dominant to just report 0 (and receive
your full value for the turn). Note that the reward the arm receives in expectation for this
round is (u+ log(wi))µi; we will use this later.
For step (2), assume that i = i∗; otherwise, arm i is played only once, and the dominant
strategy is to report 0 and receive expected reward µi. Depending on what happened in step
(1), there are two cases; either w′ ≤ µi, or w′ > µi. We will show that if w′ ≤ µi, the arm
should play w′ for the next R rounds (not defecting) and report 0 for the bonus round. If
w′ > µi, the arm should play 0 (defecting immediately).
Note that we can recast step (2) as follows: arm i starts by receiving a reward from his
distribution Di. For the next R turns, he can pay w
′ for the privilege of drawing a new
reward from his distribution (ending the game immediately if he refuses to pay). If w′ ≤ µi,
then paying for a reward w′ is positive in expectation, whereas if w′ > µi, then paying for
a reward is negative in expectation. It follows that the dominant strategy is to continue to
report w′ if w′ ≤ µi (receiving a total expected reward of R(µi−w′)+µi) and to immediately
defect and report 0 if w′ > µi (receiving a total expected reward of µi).
Finally, we analyze step (1). We will show that, regardless of the values reported by the
other players, it is a dominant strategy for arm i to report its true mean µi. If arm i reports
wi, and i 6= i∗, then arm i will receive in expectation reward
G = (µi − wi) + µi +max(u+ log(wi), 0)µi
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If u + log(wi) > 0, then this is maximized when wi = µi and G = (u + log(µi) + 1)µi (note
that by our construction of u, u+ log(µi) ≥ 1). On the other hand, if u+ log(wi) ≤ 0, then
this is maximized when wi = 0 and G = 2µi. Since u+log(µi)+1 ≥ 2, the overall maximum
occurs at wi = µi.
Similarly, when arm i reports wi and i = i
∗, then arm i receives in expectation reward
G′ = (µi − wi) + min(0, R(µi − w′)) + µi +max(u+ log(wi), 0)µi
which is similarly maximized at wi = µi. Finally, it follows that if µi ≤ w′, G = G′, so it
is dominant to report wi = µi. On the other hand, if µi > w
′, then reporting wi = µi will
ensure i = i∗ and so once again it is dominant to report wi = µi.
Corollary 4.2. Under Mechanism 1, the principal will receive revenue at least µ′T − o(T )
when arms use their dominant strategies, where µ′ is the second largest mean in the set of
means µi.
Lemma 4.3. For any constant α > 0, no truthful mechanism can guarantee (αµ+(1−α)µ′)T
revenue in the worst case. Here µ is the largest value among µ1, ..., µK. And µ
′ is the second
largest value among µ1, ..., µK.
Proof. Suppose there exists an truthful mechanism A guarantees (αµ+ (1−α)µ′)T revenue
for any distributions. We will show this results in a contradiction.
We now consider L > exp(1/α) inputs. The i-th input has µ = bi = 1/2 + i/(2L) and
µ′ = 1/2. Among these inputs, one arm (call it arm j∗) is always the arm with largest mean
and another arm is always the arm with the second largest mean. Other arms have the same
input distribution in all the inputs.
Consider all the arms are using their dominant strategies. For the i-th input, let xiT be
the expected number of pulls by A on the arm k∗ and piT be the expected amount arm k
∗
gives to the principal. Because the mechanism is truthful, in the i-th distribution, arm k∗
prefers its dominant strategy than the dominant strategy it uses in some j-th distribution
(i 6= j). In other words, we have for i 6= j,
bixi − pi ≥ bixj − pj.
We also have, for all i,
bixi − pi ≥ 0.
By using these inequalities , we get for all i,
pi ≤ bixi +
i−1∑
j=1
xj(bj+1 − bj).
On the other hand, A’s revenue in the i-th distribution is at most (pi+(1−xi)µ′)T . Therefore
we have, for all i,
pi + (1− xi)µ′ ≥ α · bi + (1− α)µ′.
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So we get
(1− xi)µ′ + bixi +
i−1∑
j=1
xj(bj+1 − bj) ≥ α · bi + (1− α)µ′.
It can be simplified as
xi ≥ α+
i−1∑
j=1
xj
bj+1 − bj
bi − µ′ = α +
1
i
·
i−1∑
j=1
xj .
By induction we get for all i,
xi ≥ α
i∑
j=1
1
i
> α ln(i).
Therefore we have
xL > α ln(L) ≥ 1.
Here we get a contradiction.
Remark 4.1. The above algorithm relies on the assumption that arms know their own means
µi. However, if the arms don’t initially know their means, we can instead insert a phase at the
beginning that lasts T 2/3 rounds where we pull each arm T 2/3/K times and expect no reward
to be passed on. This allows the arms to estimate their rewards, and the following phases
can be appropriately adjusted to maintain a solution in o(T )-dominant strategies, losing an
additional O(T 2/3) in revenue for the principal, but maintaining the revenue guarantee of
µ2T − o(T ). It is an interesting question whether a more clever stochastic bandit algorithm
can be embedded without destroying dominant strategies, and also whether a solution exists
in exact dominant strategies for this model.
4.2 Strategic and Non-strategic Arms with Stochastic Values
We now consider the case when some arms are strategic and other arms are non-strategic.
Importantly, the principal does not know which arms are strategic and which are non-
strategic.
We define µi as the mean of distribution Di for i = 1, ..., K. Set B = T
2/3, M =
8T−1/3 ln(KT ) and u = − log (mini:µi 6=0 µi) + 1 +M . We assume u = o( TBK ).
Lemma 4.4. The following strategy is the dominant strategy for arm i in Mechanism 2:
1. (line 1 of Mechanism 2) For the first B rounds, report a total sum of (µi +M)B.
2. (lines 3,4 of Mechanism 2) If i = i∗, for the R rounds that the principal expects to see
reported value w′, report the value w′−M . For the B bonus rounds, report 0. If i 6= i∗,
report 0.
3. (line 5 of Mechanism 2) For all other rounds, report 0.
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Mechanism 2: Truthful mechanism for strategic/non-strategic arms in the tacit model
1 Play each arm B times (i.e. play arm 1 in the first B rounds, arm 2 in the next B rounds, etc.).
Let w¯i be the average value arm i reported in its B rounds.
2 Let i∗ = argmax w¯i (breaking ties lexicographically), and let w
′ = maxi 6=i∗ w¯i.
3 Tell arm i∗ the value of w′. Play arm i∗ for R = T − (u+ 3)BK rounds. If arm i∗ ever report
values with average less than w′ −M in any round after B rounds in this step, stop playing it
immediately. If arm i∗ gives average no less than w′ −M , play it for B bonus rounds (ignoring
the value it reports).
4 For each arm i such that i 6= i∗, play it for B rounds.
5 For each arm i satisfying u+ log(w¯i −M) ≥ 0, play it B⌊(u+ log(w¯i −M))⌋ times. Then, with
probability u+ log(w¯i −M)− ⌊u+ log(w¯i −M)⌋, play arm i for B more rounds.
Proof. Similarly as the proof of Lemma 4.1, the mechanism is divided into three parts: (1)
the start, where each arm is played B times and reports its mean, (2) the middle, where the
principal plays the best arm and extracts the second-best arm’s value (and plays each other
arm B times), and (3) the end, where the principal plays each arm some number of times,
effectively paying them off for responding truthfully in step (1). To show the above strategy
is dominant, we will proceed by backwards induction, showing that each part of the strategy
is the best conditioned on an arbitrary history.
For step (3), similarly as the proof of Lemma 4.1, it is strictly dominant for the arm to
report 0. The reward the arm receives in expectation for this step is (u+ log(w¯i −M))µiB.
For step (2), assume that i = i∗; otherwise, arm i is played B times, and the dominant
strategy is to report 0 and receive expected reward µiB. Depending on what happened in
step (1), there are two cases; either w′ −M ≤ µi, or w′ −M > µi. Similarly as the proof
of Lemma 4.1, we know that if w′ −M ≤ µi, the arm should play w′ −M for the next R
rounds (not defecting) and report 0 for B bonus rounds. If w′ −M > µi, the arm should
play 0 (defecting immediately).
For step (1), similar as the proof of Lemma 4.1, the expected reward of arm i is either
G = (µi − w¯i)B +Bµi +max(u+ log(w¯i −M), 0)Bµi
or
G′ = min(0, R(µi − w′ +M)) + (µi − w¯i)B +Bµi +max(u+ log(w¯i −M), 0)Bµi
Using the same argument as the proof of Lemma 4.1, we know arm i’s dominant strategy is
to make w¯i = µi +M .
Theorem 4.5. If all the strategic arms use their dominant strategies in Lemma 4.4, then
the principal will get at least max(us, un)T − o(T ) with probability 1 − o(1/T ). Here us is
the second largest mean of the strategic arms and un is the largest mean of the non-strategic
arms.
Proof. We prove that with high probability non-strategic arms’ reported values don’t deviate
too much from their means.
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For each non-strategic arm i, by Chernoff bound,
Pr[|w¯i − µi| ≥M/2] ≤ 2 exp(−(M/2)2B/2) ≤ 1/(KT )8
By union bound, with probability 1−o(1/T ), all non-strategic arm i satisfy |w¯i−µi| ≤M/2.
From now on, we will assume we are in the case when |w¯i − µi| < M/2, for all i such that
arm i is a non-strategic arm.
There are two cases:
1. Case 1: arm i∗ is a strategic arm. Then its easy to see that w′ ≥ us + M and
w′ ≥ un −M/2. And also µi∗ = wi∗ −M ≥ w′ −M . So only from the third step of
Mechanism 2, the principal will get at least
(w′ −M)R = max(us, un − 3M/2)R ≥ max(us, un)R− 3MR/2
= max(us, un)T −max(us, un)(u+ 3)BK − 3MR/2
= max(us, un)T − o(T ).
2. Case 2: arm i∗ is a non-strategic arm. We know that µi∗ ≥ wi∗−M/2 ≥ (w′−M)+M/2.
So by using Chernoff bound and union bound again, we know that arm i∗ will be
stopped in the third with probability o(1/T ). We also know that µi∗ ≥ wi∗ −M/2 ≥
us +M −M/2 and µi∗ ≥ wi∗ −M/2 ≥ un −M/2 −M/2. Using the same argument
as Case 1, we know that only from the third step, the principal will get at least
max(us, un)T − o(T ).
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Let D1 and D2 be distributions with means µ1 and µ2 respectively,
and both distributions supported on [
√
δ/T , 1]. We now describe the equilibrium strategy
S∗ (the below description is for arm 1; S∗ for arm 2 is symmetric):
1. Set parameters B = 6
√
Tδ/µ2 and θ =
√
δ
T
.
2. Define c1,t to be the number times arm 1 is pulled in rounds 1, ..., t. Similarly define
c2,t to be the number times arm 2 is pulled in rounds 1, ..., t.
3. For t = 1, ..., T .
(a) If there exists a t′ ≤ t− 1 such that c1,t′/µ1 < c2,t′/µ2 −B, set w1,t = v1,t.
(b) If the condition in (a) is not true, let p1,t be the probability that the principal
will pick arm 1 in this round conditioned on the history (assuming player 2 is also
playing S∗), and let p2,t = 1− p1,t. Then:
i. If c1,t−1/µ1 < c2,t−1/µ2 and p1,t/µ1 < p2,t/µ2, set w1,t = θ.
ii. Otherwise, set w1,t = 0.
We will now show that (S∗, S∗) is an O(
√
Tδ)-Nash equilibrium. To do this, for any
deviating strategy S ′, we will both lower bound u1(M,S
∗, S∗) and upper bound u1(M,S
′, S∗),
hence bounding the net utility of deviation.
We begin by proving that u1(M,S
∗, S∗) ≥ µ21T
µ1+µ2
− O(√Tδ). We need the following
lemma.
Lemma A.1. If both arms are using strategy S∗, then with probability
(
1− 4
T
)
, |c1,t/µ1 −
c2,t/µ2| ≤ B for all t ∈ [T ].
Proof. Assume that both arms are playing the strategy S∗ with the modification that they
never defect (i.e. condition (a) in the above strategy is removed). This does not change the
probability that |c1,t/µ1 − c2,t/µ2| ≤ B for all t ∈ [T ].
Define R1,t =
∑t
s=1w1,s−
∑t
s=1wIs,s be the regret the principal experiences for not playing
only arm 1. Define R2,t similarly. We will begin by showing that with high probability, these
regrets are bounded both above and below. In particular, we will show that with probability
at least 1− 2
T
, Ri,t lies in
[
−µ1
µ2
(2θ
√
T log T + δ), δ
]
for all t ∈ [T ] and i ∈ {1, 2}.
To do this, note that there are two cases where the regrets R1,t and R2,t can possibly
change. The first is when p1,t/µ1 > p2,t/µ2 and c1,t/µ1 > c2,t/µ2. In this case, the arms offer
(w1,t, w2,t) = (0, θ). With probability p1,t the principal chooses arm 1 and the regrets update
to (R1,t+1, R2,t+1) = (R1,t, R2,t + θ), and with probability p2,t the principal chooses arm 2
and the regrets update to (R1,t+1, R2,t+1) = (R1,t − θ, R2,t). It follows that E[R1,t+1/µ2 +
R2,t+1/µ1|R1,t/µ2 +R2,t/µ1] = R1,t/µ2 +R2,t/µ1 + (p1,t/µ1 − p2,t/µ2)θ ≥ R1,t/µ2 +R2,t/µ1.
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In the second case, p1,t/µ1 < p2,t/µ2 and c2,t/µ1 < c1,t/µ2, and a similar calculation
shows again that E[R1,t+1/µ2+R2,t+1/µ1|R1,t/µ2+R2,t/µ1] = R1,t/µ2+R2,t/µ1+ (p2,t/µ2−
p1,t/µ1)θ ≥ R1,t +R2,t. It follows that R1,t/µ2 +R2,t/µ1 forms a submartingale.
From the above analysis, it is also clear that |(R1,t+1/µ2 +R2,t+1/µ1)− (R1,t/µ2 +R2,t/µ1)| ≤
θ/µ2. It follows from Azuma’s inequality that, for any fixed t ∈ [T ],
Pr
[
R1,t/µ2 +R2,t/µ1 ≤ −2θ
µ2
√
T log T
]
≤ 1
T 2
Applying the union bound, with probability at least 1− 1
T
, R1,t/µ2+R2,t/µ1 ≥ − 2θµ2
√
T log T
for all t ∈ [T ]. Furthermore, since the principal is using a (T−2, δ)-low-regret algorithm, it
is also true that with probability at least 1− T−2 (for any fixed t) both R1,t and R2,t are at
most δ. Applying the union bound again, it is true that R1,t ≤ δ and R2,t ≤ δ for all t with
probability at least 1− 1
T
. Finally, combining this with the earlier inequality (and applying
union bound once more), with probability at least 1 − 2
T
, Ri,t ∈
[
−µ1
µ2
(2θ
√
T log T + δ), δ
]
,
as desired. For the remainder of the proof, condition on this being true.
We next proceed to bound the probability that (for a fixed t) c1,t/µ1−c2,t/µ2 ≤ B. Define
the random variable τ −1 to be the largest value s ≤ t such that c1,τ/µ1− c2,τ/µ2 ≤ 0 – note
that if c1,t/µ1−c2,t/µ2 ≥ 0, then c1,s/µ1−c2,s/µ2 ≥ 0 for all s in the range [τ, t]. Additionally
let ∆s denote the ±1 random variable given by the difference (c1,s/µ1−c2,s/µ2)−(c1,s−1/µ1−
c2,s−1/µ2). We can then write
c1,t/µ1 − c2,t/µ2 ≤
t∑
s=τ+1
∆s
≤
t∑
s=τ+1
∆s · 1p1,s/µ1>p2,s/µ2 +
t∑
s=τ+1
∆s · 1p1,s/µ1≤p2,s/µ2
Here the first summand corresponds to times s where one of the arms offers θ (and hence
the regrets change), and the second summand corresponds to times where both arms offer
0. Note that since c1,s/µ1 ≥ c2,s/µ2 in this interval, the regret R2,s increases by θ whenever
∆s = 1/µ1 (i.e., arm 1 is chosen), and furthermore no choice of arm can decrease R2,s in this
interval. Since we know that R2,s lies in the interval
[
−µ1
µ2
(2θ
√
T log T + δ), δ
]
for all s, this
bounds the first sum by
t∑
s=τ+1
∆s · 1p1,s>p2,s ≤
δ + µ1
µ2
(2θ
√
T log T + δ)
θ
· (1/µ1) = 1
µ2
(
2δ
θ
+ 2
√
T log T
)
On the other hand, when p1,s/µ1 ≤ p2,s/µ2, then E[∆s] = p1,s/µ1 − p2,s/µ2 ≤ 0. By
Hoeffding’s inequality, it then follows that with probability at least 1− 1
T 2
,
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t∑
s=τ+1
∆s · 1p1,s≤p2,s ≤
2
µ2
√
T log T
Altogether, this shows that with probability at least 1− 1
T 2
,
c1,t − c2,t ≤ 1
µ2
(
2δ
θ
+ 4
√
T log T
)
≤ 6
√
Tδ/µ2 = B
The above inequality therefore holds for all t with probability at least 1 − 1
T
. Likewise,
we can show that c2,t/µ2 − c1,t/µ1 ≤ B also holds for all t with probability at least 1 − 1T .
Since we are conditioned on the regrets Ri,t being bounded (which is true with probability
at least 2
T
), it follows that |c1,t/µ1 − c2,t/µ2| ≤ B for all t with probability at least 1− 4T .
By Lemma 3.3, we know that with probability 1− 4
T
, |c1,t/µ1−c2,t/µ2| ≤ B throughout the
mechanism. In this case, arm 1 never uses step (a), and c1,T ≥ µ1µ1+µ2T −
µ1µ2
µ1+µ2
B. Therefore
u1(M,S
∗, S∗) ≥
(
1− 4
T
)
· (µ1 − θ) ·
(
µ1
µ1 + µ2
T − µ1µ2
µ1 + µ2
B
)
≥ µ
2
1T
µ1 + µ2
−O(
√
Tδ)
Now we will show that u1(M,S
′, S∗) ≤ µ21T
µ1+µ2
+ O(
√
Tδ). Without loss of generality,
we can assume S ′ is deterministic. Let MR be the deterministic mechanism when M ’s
randomness is fixed to some outcome R. Consider the situation when arm 1 is using strategy
S ′, arm 2 is using strategy S∗ and the principal is using mechanism MR. There are two cases:
1. c1,t/µ1 − c2,t/µ2 ≤ B is true for all t ∈ [T ]. In this case, we have
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) ≤ c1,T · µ1 ≤ µ1
µ1 + µ2
T +
µ1µ2
µ1 + µ2
B.
2. There exists some t such that c1,t/µ1 − c2,t/µ2 > B: Let τR + 1 be the smallest t such
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that c1,t/µ1 − c2,t/µ2 > B. We know that c1,τR/µ1 − c2,τR/µ2 ≤ B. Therefore we have
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) =
T∑
t=1
(µ1 − w1,t) · 1It=1
=
T∑
t=1
(µ1 − w2,t) · 1It=1 +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ c1,τRµ1 + µ1 + (T − τR − 1)max(µ1 − µ2, 0) +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ µ1
(
µ1
µ1 + µ2
τR +
µ1µ2
µ1 + µ2
B
)
+ µ1 + (T − τR − 1) q
2
1
µ1 + µ2
+
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ µ
2
1
µ1 + µ2
T +
µ1µ2
µ1 + µ2
B + µ1 +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1.
In general, we thus have that
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) ≤ µ
2
1
µ1 + µ2
T +
µ1µ2
µ1 + µ2
B + µ1 +max
(
0,
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
)
.
Therefore
u1(M,S
′, S∗) = ER[u1(MR, S
′, S∗)]
≤ µ
2
1
µ1 + µ2
T +
µ1µ2
µ1 + µ2
B + µ1 + ER
[
max
(
0,
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
)]
.
Notice that
∑T
t=1(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1 is the regret of not playing arm 2 (i.e., R2 in the proof
of Lemma 3.3). Since the mechanism M is (ρ, δ) low regret, with probability 1− ρ, this sum
is at most δ (and in the worst case, it is bounded above by Tµ2). We therefore have that:
u1(M,S
′, S∗) ≤ µ
2
1
µ1 + µ2
T +
µ1µ2
µ1 + µ2
B + µ1 + δ + ρTµ2
≤ µ
2
1
µ1 + µ2
T +O(
√
Tδ)
From this and our earlier lower bound on u1(M,S
∗, S∗), it follows that u1(M,S
′, S∗) −
u1(M,S
∗, S∗) ≤ O(√Tδ), thus establishing that (S∗, S∗) is an O(√Tδ)-Nash equilibrium for
the arms.
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Finally, to bound the revenue of the principal, note that if the arms both play according
to S∗ and |c1,t/µ1−c2,t/µ2| ≤ B for all t (so they do not defect), the principal gets a maximum
of Tθ = O(
√
Tδ) revenue overall. Since (by Lemma 3.3) this happens with probability at
least 1− 4
T
(and the total amount of revenue the principal is bounded above by T ), it follows
that the total expected revenue of the principal is at most O(
√
Tδ).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, let µi denote the mean value of the
ith arm’s distribution Di (supported on [
√
Kδ/T , 1]). Without loss of generality, further
assume that µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µK . We will show that as long as µ1 − µ2 ≤ µ1K , there exists
some O(
√
KTδ)-Nash equilibrium for the arms where the principal gets at most O(
√
KTδ)
revenue.
We begin by describing the equilibrium strategy S∗ for the arms. Let ci,t denote the
number of times arm i has been pulled up to time t. As before, set B = 7
√
KTδ and set
θ =
√
Kδ
T
. The equilibrium strategy for arm i at time t is as follows:
1. If at any time s ≤ t in the past, there exists an arm j with cj,s − ci,s ≥ B, defect and
offer your full value wi,t = µi.
2. Compute the probability pi,t, the probability that the principal will pull arm i condi-
tioned on the history so far.
3. Offer wi,t = θ(1− pi,t).
We begin, as before, by showing that if all parties follow this strategy, then with high
probability no one will ever defect.
Lemma A.2. If all arms are using strategy S∗, then with probability
(
1− 3
T
)
, |ci,t−cj,t| ≤ B
for all t ∈ [T ], i, j ∈ [K].
Proof. As before, assume that all arms are playing the strategy S∗ with the modification
that they never defect. This does not change the probability that |ci,t − cj,t| ≤ B for all
t ∈ [T ], i, j ∈ [K].
Define Ri,t =
∑t
s=1wi,s−
∑t
s=1wIs,s be the regret the principal experiences for not playing
only arm i up until time t. We begin by showing that with probability at least 1 − 2
T
, Ri,t
lies in [−Kθ√T log T − (K − 1)δ, δ] for all t ∈ [T ] and i ∈ [K].
To do this, first note that since the principal is using a (T−2, δ)-low-regret algorithm,
with probability at least 1 − T−2 the regrets Ri,t are all upper bounded by δ at any fixed
time t. Via the union bound, it follows that Ri,t ≤ δ for all i and t with probability at least
1− 1
T
.
To lower bound Ri,t, we will first show that
∑K
i=1Ri,t is a submartingale in t. Note that,
with probability pj,t, Ri,t+1 will equal Ri,t + θ((1− pj,t)− (1− pi,t)). We then have
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E[
K∑
i=1
Ri,t+1
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
i=1
Ri,t
]
=
K∑
i=1
Ri,t +
K∑
i=1
pi,t
K∑
j=1
θ((1− pj,t)− (1− pi,t))
=
K∑
i=1
Ri,t +
K∑
i=1
pi,t
K∑
j=1
θ(pi,t − pj,t)
=
K∑
i=1
Ri,t + θ
K∑
i=1
pi,t(Kpi,t − 1)
=
K∑
i=1
Ri,t + θ
(
K
K∑
i=1
p2i,t −
K∑
i=1
pi,t
)
≥
K∑
i=1
Ri,t
where the last inequality follows by Cauchy-Schwartz. It follows that
∑K
i=1Ri,t forms a
submartingale.
Moreover, note that (since |pi − pj| ≤ 1) |Ri,t+1 − Ri,t| ≤ θ. It follows that∣∣∣∑Ki=1Ri,t+1 −∑Ki=1Ri,t∣∣∣ ≤ Kθ and therefore by Azuma’s inequality that, for any fixed
t ∈ [T ],
Pr
[
K∑
i=1
Ri,t ≤ −2Kθ
√
T log T
]
≤ 1
T 2
.
With probability 1− 1
T
, this holds for all t ∈ [T ]. Since (with probability 1− 1
T
) Ri,t ≤ δ,
this implies that with probability 1− 2
T
, Ri,t ∈
[−2Kθ√T log T − (K − 1)δ, δ].
We next proceed to bound the probability that ci,t − cj,t > B for a i, j, and t. Define
S
(i,j)
t =
(
ci,t − cj,t + 1
θ
(Ri,t − Rj,t)
)
.
We claim that S
(i,j)
t is a martingale. To see this, we first claim that Ri,t+1 − Rj,t+1 =
Ri,t − Rj,t − θ(pi,t − pj,t). Note that, if arm k is pulled, then Ri,t+1 = Ri,t + θ((1 − pi,t) −
(1 − pk,t)) = Ri,t + θ(pk,t − pi,t) and similarly, Rj,t+1 = Rj,t + θ(pk,t − pj,t). It follows that
Ri,t+1 −Rj,t+1 = Ri,t − Rj,t − θ(pi,t − pj,t).
Secondly, note that (for any arm k) E[ck,t+1 − ck,t|pt] = pk,t, and thus E[ci,t+1 − cj,t+1 −
(ci,t − cj,t)|pt] = pi,t − pj,t. It follows that
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E[S
(i,j)
t+1 − S(i,j)t |pt] = E[(ci,t+1 − cj,t+1)− (ci,t − cj,t)|pt]
+
1
θ
E[(Ri,t+1 − Rj,t+1)− (Ri,t − Rj,t)|pt]
= (pi,t − pj,t)− (pi,t − pj,t)
= 0
and thus that E[S
(i,j)
t+1 |S(i,j)t ] = S(i,j)t , and thus that S(i,j)t is a martingale. Finally, note
that |S(i,j)t+1 − S(i,j)t | ≤ 2, so by Azuma’s inequality
Pr
[
S
(i,j)
t ≥ 4
√
T log(TK)
]
≤ (TK)−2
Taking the union bound, we find that with probability at least 1 − 1
T
, S(i,j) ≤
4
√
T log(TK) for all i, j, and t. Finally, since with probability at least 1 − 2
T
each Ri,t
lies in
[−2Kθ√T log T − (K − 1)δ, δ], with probability at least 1 − 3
T
we have that (for all
i, j, and t)
ci,t − cj,t = S(i,j)t −
1
θ
(Ri,t − Rj,t)
≤ 4
√
T log(TK) +
1
θ
|Ri,t −Rj,t|
≤ 4
√
T log(TK) + 2K
√
T log T +
Kδ
θ
≤ 7Kδ
θ
= 7K
√
Tδ
= B
By Lemma A.2, we know that with probability 1− 3
T
, |ci,t− cj,t| ≤ B for all t ∈ [T ], i, j ∈
[K]. In this case, arm 1 never defect, and c1,T ≥ T/K −B. Therefore
u1(M,S
∗, S∗) ≥
(
1− 3
T
)
· (µ1 − θ) · (T/K −B)
≥ µ1T
K
(
1− 3
T
− θ
µ1
− BK
T
)
=
µ1T
K
− 3µ1/K − θT
K
− Bµ1
≥ µ1T
K
− O(
√
KTδ)
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Now we are going to show that u1(M,S
′, S∗) ≤ µ1T
K
+ O(
√
KTδ). Without loss of
generality, we can assume S ′ is deterministic. Let MR be the deterministic mechanism when
M ’s randomness is fixed to some outcome R. Consider the situation when arm 1 is using
strategy S ′, arm 2 is using strategy S∗ and the principal is using mechanism MR. There are
two cases:
1. ci,t − cj,t ≤ B is true for all t ∈ [T ] and i, j ∈ [K]. In this case, we have
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) ≤ c1,T · µ1 ≤ µ1(T + (K − 1)B)/K.
2. There exists some t ∈ [T ] and i, j ∈ [K] such that ci,t − cj,t > B: Let τR + 1 be the
smallest t such that ci,t − cj,t > B for some i, j ∈ [K]. We know that c1,τR − ci,τR ≤ B
for all i ∈ [K]. Therefore we have
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) =
T∑
t=1
(µ1 − w1,t) · 1It=1
=
T∑
t=1
(µ1 − w2,t) · 1It=1 +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ c1,τRµ1 + µ1 + (T − τR − 1)max(µ1 − µ2, 0) +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ µ1(τR +B)/K + µ1 + (T − τR − 1)(µ1/K) +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1
≤ µ1T/K + µ1(B + 1)(K − 1)/K +
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1.
In MR, we also have
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − w1,t) · 1It=1 =
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − wIt,t)−
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − wIt,t) · 1It 6=1
≤
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − wIt,t) +
τR∑
t=1
wIt,t · 1It 6=1 −
T∑
t=τR+1
(µ2 − µIt) · 1It 6=1
≤
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − wIt,t) + T (θ +B/T ) + 0.
In general, we thus have that
u1(MR, S
′, S∗) ≤ µ1T/K + µ1(B + 1)(K − 1)/K +max
(
0,
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − wIt,t) + Tθ +B
)
.
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Therefore
u1(M,S
′, S∗) = ER[u1(MR, S
′, S∗)]
≤ µ1T/K + µ1(B + 1)(K − 1)/K + ER
[
max
(
0,
T∑
t=1
(w2,t − wIt,t) + Tθ +B
)]
.
Notice that
∑T
t=1(w2,t−wIt,t) is the regret of not playing arm 2. Since the mechanism M is
(ρ, δ) low regret, with probability 1 − ρ, this sum is at most δ (and in the worst case, it is
bounded above by Tµ2). We therefore have that:
u1(M,S
′, S∗) ≤ µ1T/K + µ1(B + 1)(K − 1)/K + δ + ρTµ+Tθ +B
≤ µ1T
K
+O(
√
KTδ).
From this and our earlier lower bound on u1(M,S
∗, S∗), it follows that u1(M,S
′, S∗) −
u1(M,S
∗, S∗) ≤ O(√KTδ), thus establishing that (S∗, S∗) is an O(√KTδ)-Nash equilibrium
for the arms.
Finally, to bound the revenue of the principal, note that if the arms both play according
to S∗ and |ci,t − cj,t| ≤ B for all t ∈ [T ], i, j ∈ [K] (so they do not defect), the principal gets
a maximum of Tθ = O(
√
KTδ) revenue overall. Since (by Lemma 3.3) this happens with
probability at least 1 − 3
T
(and the total amount of revenue the principal is bounded above
by T ), it follows that the total expected revenue of the principal is at most O(
√
KTδ).
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